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Media and Education: Mythologies Old and New
Norm Friesen
In  his  essay,  Norm  Friesen  studies  the  different
conceptualizations of speaking and writing in the rational and
the  romantic  paradigm of  language  recognition  and shows
the importance of this norm setting in the face of a generation
of digital natives.
Yes,  and  numbers,  too,  chiefest  of  sciences,  I  invented  for  them,  and  the
combining of letters, creative mother of the Muses’ arts, with which to hold all
things in memory.
Aeschylus, Prometheus Unbound (459)
The origin of writing, as it has been mythologized in cultures around the
world,  typically  appears  as  an  invention  or  intervention.  Although  the
speciﬁc details differ, it generally takes the form of a kind of intrusion on
the part of a god or mythical entity into a pre-existing human order. In the
case of Prometheus, this intervention is harshly and famously punished
by the gods: Prometheus is chained to a rock, with an eagle sent to feed
on the eternally regenerated ﬂesh of his liver. In Egypt, the god Theuth,
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scribe of the gods themselves,  was said  to  have given writing to  King
Thamus,  who was to  disperse it  to  the people of  Egypt.  In  China,  the
invention of writing is credited not to a deity but to a legendary four-eyed
minister of the Yellow Emperor, Cangjie.[1]
Cangjie,  mythical  inventor  of  Chinese  logograph,  ssource:  Wikimedia
Commons;
His logographs (characters representing words or word-parts, rather than
sounds) were seen as allowing communication between heaven and earth
– although Cangjie allegedly also taught his system to the administrators
of  the empire (Yang,  An & Turner 2008:  84–86).  In  the Old Testament,
writing is ﬁrst mentioned well after the naming of the animals and the
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proliferation of diverse tongues in the story of the Tower of Babel. Its ﬁrst
prominent appearance is in the story of Moses ascending Mount Sinai to
receive God’s law. There, the Ten Commandments are said to have been
“inscribed” on tablets of stone “by the ﬁnger of God” himself. As Muslims
know,  the  ﬁrst  word  revealed  to  the  prophet  Muhammad  was  “Iqra,”
Arabic  for  “read,”  a  command  which  was  later  to  be  embodied
institutionally in the ﬁrst Islamic schools or Madrasahs (Totah 1926, 12).
Whether  Muslim,  Christian  or  Jewish,  Abrahamic  monotheists  see  the
written  “word  of  God”  as  the primary  instance  of  writing,  and
consequently as holy and inviolable: It is God’s revelation of His Truth to
mortals.  Its words are inscribed and chanted inside mosques; they are
studied and recited in churches; and they are retrieved from the arc and
read as a form of prayer in synagogues.
Mythological  accounts  of  spoken language,  however,  are  strikingly
different from descriptions of the origins of writing. Language or speech
appears  not  as  a  divine  intervention  into  human affairs.  Instead,  it  is
integrated in  or  appended to the original  process of  creation itself.  In
Norse mythology, the faculty of speech is a gift from the third son of Borr,
who also gives hearing and sight to humans at the time of their creation.
In  the  Bible,  spoken  language  is  part  of  the  pre-lapsarian,  edenic
condition. Adam and God converse with a directness that is subsequently
lost  in  communication  between  the  human  and  divine  in  dominant
monotheistic accounts. The presumed perfection and the possible return
of this original,  Adamic language has long been a matter of hope and
speculation  in  monotheistic  theologies  and  philosophies.  Greek
mythology on the other hand speaks of a language held in common by
gods and mortals,  and like the Bible,  it  also tells of the confusion and
chaos  as  diversity  is  introduced  into  it.  In  this  case,  however,  the
multiplicity of tongues is not the work of the Old Testament god Yahweh,
but  of  Hermes,  the god of  transitions and boundaries  whose name is
referenced in the modern day study of interpretation, hermeneutics.
Writing and speech, the most basic communication media, have thus long
been understood as distinct in nature and origin: Speech is a part of the
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condition of humanity, a precondition for human existence itself, and – in
its original state – a means of direct communication with God or the gods.
Writing, on the other hand, appears only afterwards, as an “invention” or
a gift, as a remedial form of communication handed by God(s) to humans,
just as Yahweh hands the tablets of the Law down to his servant Moses.
Writing  becomes  an  important,  ritualized  and  even  sacred  means  of
communication  only  after  spoken  language  has  been  rendered
problematic.  Learning to read,  or to access this sacred communication
becomes a priority in religious terms, either for a priestly class,  or for
believers generally. Unlike learning to speak, it seems that one has to be
told or commanded to read or to write: For alphabetical scripts like the
Arabic, Hebraic or the Phonetic, or for an advanced logographic writing,
like Chinese, textual competency entails ﬁrst a process of teaching and
learning  of  letters  or  units  of  inscription  which  are  in  themselves
meaningless and arbitrary. Moreover, it is with this religious imperative to
“read”  –  particularly  when interpreted  as  being  issued beyond an  elite
priestly class – that schooling as a formal institution begins. An early and
prominent example is the founding of schools during the Islamic golden
age and in the wake of  Allah’s  imperative to Mohammed (Totah 1926,
15[2]), and a later instance is the spread of schools in Europe following
the reformation (Hamilton, 1989).
Speech and text, the most basic of media, are thus qualitatively different
not only in their putative origins and cultural connotations, but also in
their educational signiﬁcance. Spoken language is given; writing on the
other hand is hard-won and must be re-won by successive generations.
Speech is autochthonous, indigenous or inherent to the human condition.
However, speech also brings with it the characteristics of this condition,
including  its  heterogeneity,  ambiguity  and  other  imperfections  –
characteristics constantly calling for interpretive or hermeneutic vigilance.
Writing, reading and textuality, on the other hand, appear as an artiﬁcial
or effortful intervention into this communicative state of affairs. This task
of  repeating  this  effort  over  generations,  moreover,  is  a  matter  of
obligation and cultivation – a matter,  in other words,  for education. In
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other words, they have long been conceived as “non-neutral,” as far as
education and other aspects are concerned.
This range of connotations and valuations remains an important, implicit
inﬂuence indispensable in the way that the normative value of writing and
speech has been understood in education and psychology. Indeed, this
paper argues that the echoes of these religious and understandings can
be  detected  in  a  great  deal  of  theory  and  debate  today  concerning
educational  media  and  technology.  This  paper  highlights  both
consistencies  and  inconsistencies  in  these  ways  of  understanding  the
educational  value  and meaning  of  speech and writing,  identifying  two
trends  or  traditions  in  particular:  A  “rationalist”  tradition  which  sees
writing as an authoritative codiﬁcation, and which emphasizes (as does
writing itself)  questions of  structure,  rules and grammar;  on the other
hand, there is a broadly “romantic” tradition which sees spoken words as
both original  and ultimate,  and which valorizes nature and expression.
The  relationship  of  speech  and  writing  as  conﬁgured  in  the  latter,
romantic  tradition  has  been  the  topic  of  ingenious  analyses  by
philosophers Jacques Derrida and Friedrich Kittler – and their illuminating
positions are brieﬂy summarized (and also brieﬂy critiqued) in this paper.
The assumptions inherent in both the romantic and rationalist positions
subsequently and repeatedly appear in the discourse of those advocating
the  use  of  various  technologies  and  media  in  education,  and  those
wishing  to  set  speciﬁc  priorities  for  school,  teaching  and  learning.  By
discussing the historical and cultural construction of these positions, this
paper hopes to show that valuations and assumptions regarding these
basic forms are ultimately contradictory and irreconcilable.
The Rationalist Tradition: The “Absolute Privilege of Writing”
Although  rationalist  and  romantic  views  of  writing  and  speech  are
preﬁgured in earlier times, this account begins with the 17th century. This
is a time still energized by the invention of the printing press, and also
reverberating with the aftershocks of the reformation and religious wars.
The early 17th century in particular, as Michel Foucault explains, is part of
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an  era  marked  by  the  “absolute  privilege  of  writing.”  It  is  a  time,  he
explains, in which
“it is the primal nature of language to be written. The sounds made by voices
provide no more than a transitory and precarious translation of it. What God
introduced into the world was written words; Adam, when he imposed their
ﬁrst names upon the animals, did no more than read those visible and silent
marks; the Law was entrusted to the Tablets, not to men’s memories; and it is
in a book that the true Word must be found again. … For it was very possible
that  before  Babel,  before  the  Flood,  there  had  already  existed  a  form  of
writing  composed  of  the  marks  of  nature  itself,  with  the  result  that  its
characters would have had the power to act upon things directly, to attract
them  or  repel  them,  to  represent  their  properties,  their  virtues,  and  their
secrets.” (1970, 37) 
The  recovery  of  this  magical,  universal,  original  and  above  all  written
language was a central goal for many thinkers and educators in the early
17th century. At this time, the reach of the printed word was starting to
stretch well beyond the “republic of letters” populated by those who could
read and correspond in the lingua franca of Latin. Political and religious
creeds  and  broadsheets  in  “vulgar”  and  still-unstandardized  native
tongues like German, French, English circulated widely. This happened at
the same time as the enormously destructive Thirty Year’s war was fought
on  the  continent  and  as  England  was  embroiled  in  its  own  civil  war.
Bacon, Hobbes and others saw linguistic ambiguity and multiplicity as a
key  underlying  problem:  Words  did  not  unambiguously  designate  the
basic things in the world, nor did their grammar reﬂect the true nature of
the  interrelationships  of  these  things.  The  invention  or  recovery  of  a
universal language, often envisioned as a literal return to the language of
Adam, reﬂecting God’s created order in its original state,  was a central
inspiration for example, for the central-European educator and polymath
Johann  Amos  Comenius.  Quoting  Comenius’  own  words,  Stillman
explains:
“Faced with the ruin of his ‘country, her churches and her schools’ in a conﬂict
‘threatening the Christian world with disaster and desolation’… Comenius…
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recommended  as  the  cure  for  civilization’s  ills  the  creation  of  a  universal
language, ‘a language absolutely new, absolutely easy, absolutely rational, in
brief a Pansophic language, the universal carrier of light.’” (1995, 29)
For  Comenius,  the ﬁrst  step to  a  pansophic  language –  one reﬂecting
knowledge of all  things by all  people – was to elevate God’s rationally-
ordered creation above existing human languages. In his Didactica Magna,
for  example,  Comenius  states  that  “things  are  essential,  words  only
accidental; things the body, words the garment; things… the kernel, words
the  shell  and  the  husk”  (1896,  267).  The  implications  for  educational
media are clear: If only people could learn ﬁrst through the visible world,
and from there, acquire language, this language would reﬂect this visible
order, and would be that much closer to the original, ordered language
shared by God and Adam. Indeed, as one historian explains, Comenius
envisioned that this “artiﬁcial language [was] to take the same shape as
the basic Latin presented in [his own] textbooks” (Slaughter 1982, 114).
The most famous of Comenius’ textbooks is the Orbis pictus (1658), and in
the introduction to this text, Comenius insists that teaching itself must
“be clear, and by that, ﬁrm and solid, if whatever is taught and learned, be not
obscure, or confused, but apparent, distinct, and articulate, as the ﬁngers on
the hands. The ground of this business, is that sensual objects may be rightly
presented to the senses, for fear they may not be received. I say, and say it
again aloud, that this last is the foundation of all the rest: because we can
neither act nor speak wisely, unless we ﬁrst rightly understand all the things
which are to be done, and whereof we are to speak.” (Comenius 1777: 2)
The way that Comenius ordered words, concepts and the things of the
world is by connecting schematic illustrations of such things (pictured on
one page) to their common and Latin names and descriptions (often on
the facing page).
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Things of ‘The World,’ from Orbis Pictus, with labels in English and Latin, 
source: public domain/Google book
These were grouped together in 150 topics or themes, each containing
many  numbered  items  and  their  corresponding  meanings.  Together,
these  allowed  Comenius  to  “rightly  present”  “sensual  objects…  to  the
senses,”  with each numbered object  linked to text  showing the reader
“whereof we are to speak.” As an early English translator of Orbis Pictus
points  out,  the  approach  of  this  text  seems  best  suited  to  a  “child’s
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capacity of six or seven years of age (seeing we have now such commonly
brought to our Grammar-schools to learn the Latin Tongue)” (Hoole 1777,
13).  In  terms of  educational  media, Comenius’  project  is  powerful  but
paradoxical – as is the case with many later efforts to mediate speech and
writing  in  education.  To  recover  universal  transparency  in  language,
Comenius resorts to the newest and most artiﬁcial of media of the time:
numbered  schematic  engravings,  and  with  their  corresponding  names
printed next to them.
A related but different aﬃrmation of privilege or primacy of the visible
and written word is evident in the work of a contemporary only six years
younger  than  Comenius,  René  Descartes.  Descartes’  speciﬁc
understanding  of  the  sign  –  embodied  paradigmatically  in  logical  and
mathematical operators – is one, as Foucault says, that is central to the
classical self-understanding world view or episteme of the 17th century.
This  leads  away  from  Comenius’  hope  to  recover  a  pre-lapsarian
language,  and  points  towards  a  more  explicitly  rationalistic  project.  In
writing  “I  think  therefore  I  am,”  for  example,  Descartes  is  not  only
conﬁrming the power of signs to identify things clearly and distinctly in
the world (including thought and self), he is also underscoring the power
of conjunctions of logical operators (e.g., “therefore”) to help establish the
nature  of  their  interrelationship.  Foucault  explains  the  epochal
signiﬁcance of such a view of written language:
“there exists a single, necessary arrangement running through the whole of the
Classical episteme: the association of a universal calculus and a search for the
elementary within a system that is artiﬁcial and is, for that very reason, able
to make nature visible from its primary elements right to the simultaneity of
all their possible combinations. In the Classical age… the task of knowledge…
is to fabricate a language, and to fabricate it well – so that, as an instrument
of  analysis  and combination,  it  will  really  be the language of  calculation.”
(1970, 61)
Such a fabricated language of calculation is indispensable in connecting
the rationalist tradition of the 17th century to more recent developments.
And  such  a  connection  is  provided  by  the  self-described  “Cartesian”
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linguistics of Noam Chomsky – someone whose work has done much to
re-establish the dominance of the rationalist approaches to educational
media. But before this paper turns to Chomsky, it looks to the opposed,
romantic  position  or  tradition  of  media  prescription  and privileging  in
education.
The Romantic Tradition: “Accents, Cries, Complaints”
Among  the  intervening  developments  of  importance  to  media  in
education is the emergence of romanticism in the 18th Century – in part
as a reaction against the rationalism of Descartes and others like him.
Jean-Jacques  Rousseau,  famous  both  as  an  early  romantic  and  an
educationist, did much to establish the foundational elements. Rousseau
starts his Essay on the Origin of Languages (written in the 1750’s) with the
assertion that language “did not begin by reasoning but by feeling,”
“…in order to move a young heart,  to  repulse an unjust  aggressor,  nature
dictates accents,  cries,  complaints.  The most ancient words are invented in
this  way,  and this  is  why  the  ﬁrst  languages  were  tuneful  and passionate
before being… methodical and reasoned.” (1998, 294)
Language is not exempliﬁed in logical operators or the rational order of
nature;  it  is  instead an extension of  an expression or  cry  of  emotion.
Language  does  not  reduce  to  grammar,  rules  and  logic  –  whether  it
reﬂects  the  order  of  creation  or  that  of  human  calculation  –  but  to
expression  and  feeling.  Through the  introduction  of  writing,  and  even
more forcefully through the printed word, language, Rousseau explains, is
alienated from this  original  and natural  condition.  It  is  deprived of  its
original energy, passion and musicality, and becomes abstract.
“The more voices become monotone, the more consonants multiply, and that
as accents are eliminated and quantities are equalized, they are replaced by
grammatical combinations and new articulations… Writing, which seems as if
it should ﬁx language, is precisely what alters it; it changes not its words but
its  genius;  it  substitutes precision for  expressiveness.  Feelings are conveyed
when one speaks and ideas when one writes. In writing, one is forced to take
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all  the  words  according  to  common acceptation… it  is  not  possible  for  a
language one writes to keep for long the liveliness of one that is only spoken…
The means taken up to compensate for this quality [work to] diffuse, [and]
elongate written language and, passing from books into discourse, enervate
speech itself.” (1998, 300)
Writing  for  Rousseau  is  hardly  a  gift  from  the  gods,  a  divine  means
through which holy truths are transmitted to the world of mortals – and
that  we  are  then  expected  to  “read.”  Instead,  it  is  an  enervation  of
originally tuneful and passionate expressions of feeling, or of accents or
cries of joy or sorrow. Grammar and rules of “common acceptation” – as
well as a general “methodical and reasoned” quality – become dominant
in language only when it falls under the inﬂuence of writing and abstract
ideas, and when it loses its ties to feeling and expression with which it
began.
Rousseau, like Comenius, can be seen to have developed his views as an
educationist  in  a  manner  quite  consistent  with  his  understandings  of
writing and language. In Emile, his famous novel of education, Rousseau
recommends that the eponymous protagonist not be exposed to books,
or otherwise be given “lessons” until well into his adolescence. Rousseau
sees programmatic instruction and any concerted effort to teach reading
and  writing  as  harmful  and  unnecessary,  and  as  something  to  be
postponed for as long as possible:
“When I thus get rid of children’s lessons, I get rid of the chief cause of their
[children’s] sorrows, namely their books. Reading is the curse of childhood, yet
it  is  almost the only occupation you can ﬁnd for children. Emile,  at twelve
years old, will hardly know what a book is. But, you say, he must at least know
how to read. I agree; he must know how to read when reading becomes useful
to him. But until then it is only a way of boring him.” (1950, 80)
Until  reading and writing can no longer be avoided,  the only  mediatic
exposure  and  practice  that  the  child  should  undergo  is  with  spoken
language.  Consistent  with  his  remarks  in  the  Essay  on  the  Origin  of
Languages, Rousseau also speciﬁes how Emile is to be instructed in speech
and diction. This instruction is to be largely (but not completely) devoid of
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the characteristics that Rousseau sees as introduced into speech through
writing. Rousseau recommends that instead the child be encouraged to
speak with the musicality and expressivity of the unwritten dialects of the
provinces. But at the same time, it  is important to note that Rousseau
supplements this with further recommendations:
“Brought up in all the rustic simplicity of the country, your children will gain a
more sonorous voice; they will  not acquire the hesitating stammer of town
children, neither will they acquire the expressions nor the tone of the villagers,
or if they do they will easily lose them; their master being with them from their
earliest years, and more and more in their society the older they grow, will be
able to prevent or efface by speaking correctly himself the impression of the
peasants’ talk. Emile will speak the purest French I know, but he will speak it
more distinctly and with a better articulation than myself.” (1950, 32)
Rousseau  envisions  a  naturalness  of  verbal  expression  commensurate
with the “rustic simplicity of the country,” but at the same time, he also
sees Emile’s speech as avoiding the less desirable characteristics of this
unspoiled  dialect.  Through  the  intervention  of  “a  master”  who is  with
Emile  from  his  “earliest  years,”  the  child’s  speech  will  incorporate
“neither…the expressions nor the tone of the villagers.” In other words,
Rousseau imagines a natural sonority accompanied at the same time by a
distinctness and articulation that is proper only to the “purest French.”
This simultaneous aﬃrmation of and distantiation from originary, natural
speech  or  orality  is  mirrored  in  Rousseau’s  explicit  recommendations
concerning  writing.  For  despite  having  already  stated  that  “Emile,  at
twelve years old, will hardly know what a book is” Rousseau admits the
following elsewhere in his novel:
“I  am pretty  sure  Emile  will  learn to  read and write  before  he is  ten,  just
because I care very little whether he can do so before he is ﬁfteen; but I would
rather he never learnt to read at all, than that this art should be acquired at
the price of all that makes reading useful.” (1950, 179)
Just as Emile will  embody the sonority of the country while possessing
none  of  its  coarseness,  he  will  also  learn  to  read  and  write  without
lessons, and indeed, while “hardly knowing what a book is.” Paradoxically,
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Emile will learn to read precisely because of general indifference towards
reading and writing: “because I care very little whether he can do so.”
Rousseau’s  fundamental  ambivalence  regarding  the  “naturalness”  of
speech  and  the  artiﬁciality  of  writing  has  been  famously  dissected  in
Derrida’s  analysis  the  “supplement”  in  Of  Grammatology.  As  Derrida
explains,
“The speech that Rousseau raise[s] above writing is speech as it should be or
rather as it should have been… He valorizes and disqualiﬁes writing at the
same time.  At  the  same time;  that  is  to  say,  in  one  divided  but  coherent
movement.  We  must  try  not  to  lose  sight  of  its  strange  unity.  Rousseau
condemns writing as destruction of presence and as disease of speech. He
rehabilitates it to the extent that it promises the reappropriation of that of
which speech allowed itself to be dispossessed.” (1974, 141–142)
Rousseau, in other words, valorizes original speech as an ideal form that
is natural and complete in itself. But at the same time as he condemns
writing  as  the  “curse  of  childhood,”  he  relies  on  the  distinctness  and
articulation of writing in describing ideal speech. “Writing” in this sense, as
Derrida explains, “is the supplement par excellence:” It is “an inessential
extra added to something [already, allegedly] complete in itself"  (1974,
281).  Textuality,  to  generalize  further,  is  acceptable  in  the  romantic
tradition only insofar as it is like speech, and can be assimilated to and
support naturalized speech. There are various ways through which this
can be accomplished.  Rousseau sees it  as  taking place by avoiding as
much as possible any direct exposure to writing and printed books, and
by having any characteristics associated with these forms introduced only
indirectly into spoken language, through a cultivated master.
Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, a Romantic educational theorist who shared
Rousseau’s valorization of original orality, points to another method for
the  supplementation  of  speech  by  writing.  This  is  to  be  found  in
Pestalozzi’s  advice  to  mothers,  particularly  concerning  how they  might
teach their children to read and write. Like Rousseau, Pestalozzi uses a
ﬁctional account to make his points, and he also begins by denouncing
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premature lessons in reading and writing. Describing “Gertrude and her
[seven] children,” Pestalozzi explains:
“Although  Gertrude  thus  exerted  herself  to  develop  very  early  the  manual
dexterity of her children, she was in no haste for them to learn to read and
write. But she took pains to teach them early how to speak; for, as she said, ‘of
what use is it for a person to be able to read and write, if he cannot speak? –
since reading and writing are only artiﬁcial sort of speech.’  To this end she
used to make the children pronounce syllables after her in regular succession,
taking them from an old A-B-C book she had.  This  exercise in correct  and
distinct  articulation  was,  however,  only  a  subordinate  object  in  her  whole
scheme of  education,  which embraced a true comprehension of  life  itself.”
(1889, 130)
Since reading and writing are only an “artiﬁcial sort of speech,” Gertrude
covertly prepares the children to reading and writing through her own
version of this “artiﬁcial  speech.” This consists,  in Pestalozzi’s words, of
“mak[ing] the children pronounce syllables after her in regular succession,
taking  them  from  an  old  A-B-C  book.”  Such  a  book  is  then  used  to
structure “exercise[s] in correct and distinct articulation.” This pattern of
using not only reading and writing, but also the medium print, to sustain
an orality allegedly primary to and freed from the contamination of print,
is  common  in  Romantic  pedagogies  –  or  in  those  that  are  today
considered “progressive.” It is to be found not in Rousseau and Pestalozzi,
but  as  Friedrich  Kittler  points  out,  it  is  also  endemic  in  instruction
manuals for mothers that proliferated in the 18th century. In a chapter
called  “The  Mother’s  Mouth”  in  his  book  on  Discourse  Networks
(Aufschreibesysteme, 1985), Kittler explains:
“A simple and direct  shortcircuit  characterized [this]  pedagogical  discourse.
Educational tracts and primers written explicitly for mothers obliterated their
own  textuality  for  the  sake  of  their  addressees.  Books  disappeared  in  a
Mother’s Mouth whose original self-exploratory experience had been instituted
by those very books… The phonetic method… substituted for the textuality of
the book and alphabet a Voice [sic] that neither read aloud nor imitated, but
instead spontaneously created the pure sounds of the high idiom or mother
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tongue… For  the  sake  of  the  Mother,  a  book  would  forget  being  a  book.
Pestalozzi made this shortcircuit explicit in his joyful exclamation, "The book is
not yet there, and already I see it disappearing again through its effects!”[3]
(1992, 53)
The  romantic  tradition,  in  other  words,  produces  a  contradiction
concerning  writing  and  speech  that  inverts  the  one  produced  by
Comenius and the rationalist tradition: Comenius sees written language
as  primary,  and  advocates  a  return  to  an  original,  universal,  and
transparent  writing.  Speech  for  him  and  other  “rationalists”  is  only  a
derivation  of  writing,  and  pedagogical  and  educational  efforts  are
evaluated in this  tradition in terms of  their  ability  to connect  with the
primal written nature of communication or of thought itself.
Exercises  for  pronunciation  from Pestalozzi’s  How Gertrude  Teaches  her
Children, 
source: public domain
Educational  theorists  and  practitioners  labeled  as  “romantic”  are
diametrically opposed. They attempt to reduce text and symbols to the
supposed “naturalness” of speech. “Reading and writing,” as Pestalozzi’s
Gertrude says, “are only an artiﬁcial sort of speech.” But Rousseau and
Pestalozzi, and by implication, others in this tradition, go a signiﬁcant step
further: They also advocate a return to speech in its natural and originary
state through speciﬁc methods and techniques – procedures which at the
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same time rely explicitly on the intervention writing itself. For Pestalozzi,
as Kittler point out, this is embodied in the function of the A-B-C book that
Gertrude uses for “exercise[s] in correct and distinct articulation” with her
children. For Rousseau, a similar effect is achieved in Emile’s education
through  the  intervention  of  a  cultivated  master  who  will  “prevent  or
efface…  the  impression  of  the  peasants  talk…  by  speaking  correctly
himself.”
A  similar  “simple  and  direct  shortcircuit”  can  be  said  to  characterize
pedagogical  prescriptions  of  later  ﬁgures  with  broadly  “romantic”  and
“progressive” sympathies. John Dewey, the father of American progressive
education, labels the belief that children should learn reading and writing
in the early grades as “false educational god.” Referring in 1898 to recent
rise  of  “magazines,  libraries,  art-galleries  and  all  the  daily  play  of
intellectual  intercourse,”  Dewey  remarks  that  the  “methods  of  the
discovery and communication of truth… [now] have become direct and
independent, instead of remote and tied to the intervention of teacher or
book” (1940, pp. 18, 19, 22). Although he asserts knowledge and the truth
itself is to be found in magazines and libraries, Dewey – like Rousseau and
Pestalozzi before him – keeps this “dangerous supplement” (Rousseau, as
cited in Derrida 1974, 141) at arm’s length from any explicit educational
efforts. Textual ability is then learned by children not through any adult
efforts, but precisely in spite of these. It is to occur as Dewey describes,
through “the teacher[s] …power to transmute symbols and contents into
their  working  psychical  equivalents”  (1900,  105)  or  simply  though  the
spontaneous event of “children teach[ing] themselves… to read:”
“Reading is  not  to  them an isolated exercise;  it  is  a  means of  acquiring a
much-desired  object.  Like  climbing  the  pantry  shelves,  its  diﬃculties  and
dangers  are  lost  sight  of  in  the  absorbing  desire  to  satisfy  the  mental
appetite.” (Dewey & Dewey 1915, 22)
The difference between Dewey and his romantic predecessors, perhaps
strangely, is that Dewey does not suggest a “ruse” or “trick” such as the
cultivated master or the A-B-C books of Rousseau or Pestalozzi. Instead,
he seems to see a natural, textual ﬂuency being ushered in through the
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ubiquitous circulation of knowledge itself, swirling around the pupil, and
leading him or her to engage with it through spontaneous desire or via a
sort of “transmutation.”
Chomsky’s Syntatic Structures and Media Neutrality
To return brieﬂy to the rationalists, the theory of universal grammar or
syntax  of  Noam  Chomsky  is  one  which  in  many  ways  inaugurated
cognitive  revolution  of  the  1960’s  and  1970’s.  Cognitivism,  in  turn,  is
arguably still  the dominant account of mind and communication in the
Anglo-American  world.  Like  Comenius’  dream  of his  own  universal
linguistic order and Descartes’ contributions to a purely rational language
of calculation, Chomsky’s universal, generative or transformative syntax,
has done much to popularize the rationalist  privileging of  writing,  and
conceptions of the primal nature of language as writing, in educational
thinking.  Like  Comenius,  Chomsky  sees  language,  speciﬁcally  rules  of
syntax and grammar, as embodying an order and logic that is universal.
There are a few important differences, however, that separate Chomsky’s
“Cartesian  linguistics”  from  earlier  dreams  of  a  perfect  and  universal
language: Chomsky’s universal language is not one that has been lost or
that needs to be invented. Instead, it is believed to precede any and all
language,  of  necessity  undergirding  all  forms  of  linguistic  expression,
whether  living  or  dead.  At  the  same  time,  though,  it  is  not  directly
accessible through any one existing tongue or dialect. It is locked away
from direct access, and is manifest only very indirectly through syntactic
commonalities  shared  between  the  actual  human  languages  that  it
generates. As Chomsky explains in his Syntactic Structures, this language is
not an expressive sonority,  but possible combinations or sequences of
discrete elements:
“…I will consider a language to be a set (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) of sentences, each
ﬁnite in length and constructed out of a ﬁnite set of elements… or symbols…
All natural languages in their spoken or written form are languages in this
sense…. The fundamental aim in the linguistic analysis of a language …is to
separate  the  grammatical  sequences  which  are  the  sentences…  [in  this
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language] from the ungrammatical sequences which are not sentences… and
to study the structure of the grammatical sequences.” (2002, pp. 13, 21)
What is most important for Chomsky, in other words, is the structure of
(both  correct  and  incorrect)  grammatical  sequences  that  may  be
assembled  from  any  language  or  ﬁnite  set  of  elements  or  symbols.
Chomsky’s  concern  here  is  principally  on  the  complexity of  the
grammatical rules that govern these combinations or constructions. He
sees these as determined by the universal “deep structures” common to
all languages, structures that undergo logical “transformations” to form
the speciﬁc rules of any given language.
Chomsky  uses  this  hypothesis  to  explain  the  kind  of  natural,  early
language  learning,  the  pure  and  innocent  orality  so  privileged  by
Rousseau and Pestalozzi.  If  the language that  every  infant  learns  with
such apparent ease is governed by computationally complex rules and
transformations, then the infant must be born with what Chomsky refers
to as a “machine:” a computational language organ that is closely coupled
with  sensory  inputs,  and  that  has  “data-handling  or  ‘hypothesis-
formulating’ ability of unknown character and complexity.” (1957, 57)
Chomsky’s theory of language offers a way of understanding a range of
media,  including  writing,  speech,  and  more  recent  media  forms  or
technologies.  A  speciﬁc  language  or  form  of  communication  or  even
instruction can be seen as simply a function of an underlying set of rules
and computations. It  is just one of many potential systems of symbols
that can be generated through transformations of underlying universal
structures, and that can be eﬃciently processed through human cognitive
machinery. As indicated above, Chomsky’s particular conﬁguration of the
questions  of  language,  universality  and  rationality  has  laid  the
groundwork for a wide range of theories and studies of learning and of
educational  media.  The  question  for  each  of  these  becomes  one  of
constructing other media or “symbol systems” so that they engage with
this encoding as eﬃciently as possible. The issue, in other words, is to use
technologies and that which is most artiﬁcial in order to connect with that
which is most deeply human and natural.
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One example of this way of evaluating the potential of media systems is
provided  by  a  well-known  piece  that  initiated  a  decades-long  debate
about the neutrality  of  media for  instruction.  This  is  Richard E.  Clarks’
“Reconsidering  Research  on  Learning  from  Media”  appearing  in  1983.
From  a  North-American  perspective,  this  debate  serves  as  a  central
reference  point  in  discussions  regarding  the  neutrality  of  media  in
education.  Clark  begins  by  aﬃrming  the  basic  premise  that  different
media,  such  as  television,  computers  or  books,  represent  different
“symbol systems” or “symbolic ‘elements’ of instruction,” and that these
are  in  turn  subject  to  speciﬁc  “processing”  and “transformations”  by  a
human data processing machine or cognitive apparatus:
“All  instructional  messages  [are]  coded  in  some  symbolic  representational
system… and symbols vary in the cognitive transformation they allow us to
perform on the information we select from our environment.” (Clark 1983, 74)
Clark’s  most  signiﬁcant  point,  however,  is  that  a  given  medium and a
speciﬁc symbol system are not exactly the same. He reminds his readers,
for example,  that  it  is  possible to present the symbol  system of “text”
using the medium or hardware of a book or of a computer screen. As a
corollary, Clark also maintains that no medium can be seen as a necessary
causal  factor  in  learning.  Media  instead  can  only  be  very  broadly
correlated  with  changes  in  learning  performance.  Although  symbol
systems  vary  (and  may  even  vary  in  their  suitability  for  the  human
cognitive  processing)  no  one  medium  has  exclusive  claim  to  any  one
symbol  system,  and thus  to  a  possible  direct  and causal  inﬂuence on
learning – or in other words, to even a minimal, functionalist normative
signiﬁcance.
Clark further points to 70 years of research, starting with the behaviourist
use  of  pictures  as  instructional  media  in  1912.  He  notes  that  it  has
generally  failed to  support  the medium of  instruction as  a  statistically
signiﬁcant  factor  in  learning  performance.  Clark  ends  his  article  by
concluding:  “It  seems  reasonable  to  recommend,  therefore,  that
researchers  refrain  from  producing  additional  studies  exploring  the
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relationship  between  media  and  learning  unless  novel  theory  is
suggested” (1983, 90).
Romantic Rationalism: France, Mathland, Natives and Immigrants
As indicated above, no new or truly “novel” theory that would radically
reconﬁgure  media  and  learning  has  emerged  since  Clark’s
pronouncement. Instead, the conceptual vocabulary of cognitive theory
has been only gradually adapted and augmented by constructivist  and
other inﬂuences. In the terms of this paper’s analyses, these adaptations
and augmentations can be said to integrate aspects of both romantic and
rational traditions in their prescriptions concerning media and education.
A ﬁrst and fundamental move in this synthesis is to aﬃrm the cognitivist
notion that the eﬃciency of oral language learning is something that can
be readily transferred to other “symbol systems” and media forms. These
include anything from ﬁlm to radio and television to video games and
touch-screen interfaces. Such technologies, like spoken languages, share
the  characteristic  that  familiarity  with  their  use  can  be  acquired  at  a
young age, and without formal teaching or structured effort. At the same
time, this “romantic rationalism” engages in a notable downplaying of the
speciﬁcs of any transformational cognitive machine that might underlie
the acquisition of a linguistic or technical skill.
One  of  the  earliest  advocates  of  computer  media  or  technology  to
develop arguments on this basis is Seymour Papert, who combined the
constructivism of Jean Piaget with the computational cognitivism of the
MIT  (Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology)  milieu  that  he  shared  with
Chomsky in the 60’s and 70’s. Papert begins his account (taken from his
1980 book,  Mindstorms:  Children,  Computers,  and Powerful  Ideas)  beings
identifying “the model of successful learning” as being “the way a child
learns to talk, a process that takes place without deliberate and organized
teaching.”  Saying  that  “Piaget  is  at  the  center  of  the  concerns  of  this
book,”  Papert  goes  on  to  label  this  type  of  learning  –  one  occurring
without  teaching  –  as  "Piagetian  learning."  He  then  asserts  that  such
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natural and effortless learning is also in the foreground when children
have the opportunity to program computers:
“Programming a computer means nothing more or less than communicating
to it in a language that it and the human user can both "understand." And
learning languages is one of the things children do best. Every normal child
learns to talk. Why then should a child not learn to "talk" to a computer? …it is
possible to design computers so that learning to communicate with them can
be a natural process, more like learning French by living in France… than like
trying to learn it through the unnatural process of American foreign-language
instruction in classrooms.” (1980, 5–6)
Papert here begins with a variation of a gesture that is common to many
rationalists: the elimination of fundamental differences between speech
and  writing.  Like  Chomsky,  Papert  is  asserting  (albeit  tacitly)  that  “All
natural languages in their spoken or written form are …constructed out of
a ﬁnite set of elements… or symbols.” But it is soon after this point that
Papert and Chomsky part company. Papert not only goes further than
Chomsky in considering artiﬁcial computer languages also as effectively
the  same  as  their  “natural”  spoken  counterparts,  but  in  ignoring  the
notion of any underlying, rational code. For Papert, all manifestations of
writing and speech are the same in that they are at heart a manifestation
the “natural” orality of early childhood, exemplifying “Piagetian learning.”
Papert goes on to argue that computers present to children not only a
language, but also a “living” linguistic environment or culture. In the case
of the computer,  this language is not so much about learning to say “
Bonne nuit” or “je m’appelle John” but about learning to speak the language
of a living environment of math and geometry:
“The computer can be a mathematics-speaking and an alphabetic-speaking
entity… When this communication occurs,  children learn mathematics as a
living  language.  Moreover,  mathematical  communication  and  alphabetic
communication are thereby both transformed from the alien and therefore
diﬃcult things they are for most children into natural and therefore easy ones.
The idea of "talking mathematics" to a computer can be generalized to a view
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of learning mathematics in "Mathland;" that is to say, in a context which is to
learning mathematics what living in France is to learning French.” (1980, 6)
Of course, there are no names, times of day or even other people in the
place called Mathland; in their place, there is a textual interface, allowing
the student to compose lines of code, instructing the computer to can
draw lines and shapes in this imaginary land. The computer “replies” in
this “conversation” by displaying executed operations, or presenting error
messages.
An example of commands and drawing from Papert’s Logo Programming
Language,
an early precursor to Mathland, source: Wikimedia Commons
Neither  the  differences  between  writing  and  speech  –  nor  those
separating the variety of everyday language from the terse commands of
programming  –  have  stopped  others  from  repeating  very  similar
extended  analogies  regarding  early  language  learning  and  more
advanced  tasks  in  computer  environments.  In  fact,  intervening
developments in computer hardware and software seen to have made
such comparisons even more popular and tempting.
For example, in his recent book Teaching Minds: How Cognitive Science Can
Save Our Schools (2006a), Roger Schank links early language learning with
“learning by doing” – and sees the latter as exempliﬁed in learning to walk
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and talk. He invokes cognitive theory of rational, goal-directed action to
make the argument that
“Everything we do as human beings is goal-directed. We pursue goals as soon
as we are born. We try hard to learn to walk, talk… If school related to the
goals that children actually had… [it] would seem like a natural and helpful
experience. Students wouldn’t stress about satisfying their teachers any more
than they stressed about satisfying their parents when they were learning to
walk and talk.”(8)
Here  and  elsewhere,  Schank  envisions  a  kind  of  naturally-occurring
“experiential” learning as being realized in the context of “online, learning-
by-doing,  experience based, learning environment[s,  in which] teaching
occurs  on an as-needed basis”  (2006b,  590).  In  other  words:  we learn
complex  things  like walking  and  our  ﬁrst  language(s)  “naturally;”
therefore, we should emulate this learning-by-doing, and we can do so
most effectively through computers.
Finally, a slightly different but enormously popular variation on discourses
connecting early language learning with new media and technology has
been provided by Marc Prensky and his notion of young “digital natives”
and older “digital immigrants.” Like many before him, Prensky begins his
argument with a broad comparison of linguistic ﬂuency with ﬂuency in
the use of computers and similar technologies. Unlike Papert (or Schank),
however, Prensky does not see early language learning as “the model of
successful learning” for just any age or subject. Instead, Prensky’s position
is that this type of learning is the exclusive possession of the young, and
that the best that any older generation can do is learn – either ﬁguratively
or literally – with an immigrant’s accent.
“Today’s students – K through college – represent the ﬁrst generations to grow
up with this new technology. They have spent their entire lives surrounded by
and  using  computers,  videogames,  digital  music  players,  video  cams,  cell
phones, and all the other toys and tools of the digital age. What should we call
these “new” students of today? Some refer to them as the N-(for Net)-gen or D-
(for  digital)-gen.  But  the most  useful  designation I  have found for  them is
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Digital  Natives.  Our  students  today  are  all  “native  speakers”  of  the  digital
language of computers, video games and the Internet.” (2001, 1)
This  argument,  which  has  been  repeated  and  reinterpreted  in  a  wide
range  of  presentations  and  publications  (e.g.,  Stoerger  2009;  Prensky
2010),[4] valorizes natural spoken language learning and applies it also to
technology.  By  way  of  contrast,  it  the  awkward  foreignness  of  adults,
particularly  teachers,  who  lack  ﬂuency  in  this  language,  and  the
educational  priorities  and  institutions  with  which  they  are  often
associated:
“…the  single  biggest  problem  facing  education  today  is  that  our  Digital
Immigrant  instructors,  who  speak  an  outdated  language  (that  of  the  pre-
digital age), are struggling to teach a population that speaks an entirely new
language. This is obvious to the Digital Natives – school often feels pretty much
as  if  we’ve  brought  in  a  population  of  heavily  accented,  unintelligible
foreigners to lecture them. They often can’t understand what the Immigrants
are saying. What does “dial” a number mean, anyway?” (emphasis in original;
2001, 1)
Prensky can be seen to be repeating the pattern of valorizing naturally-
learned  skills  and  abilities  –those  modeled  in  natural  oral  language
learning – and as suppressing the textual as the “dangerous supplement.”
He engages, in other words, in the “simple and direct shortcircuit” that
Kittler attributes to Pestalozzi’s Gertrude. But unlike Gertrude, Prensky is
not simply suppressing or shortcircuiting the text that is used to teach
“correct and distinct articulation;” he is instead omitting the role of writing
as  described  at  the  outset  of  this  paper:  as  an  inter-generational
undertaking or obligation that is the raison d’être of school and education.
The  foreignness  of  the  school  and  of  educational  processes  to  those
raised  with  cell  phones  and  video  cams  (and  earlier,  TVs)  is  not  an
incidental characteristic of education or schooling; it is instead arguably
expressive of its very essence. In addition, the skills and abilities cultivated
in this outdated and unintelligible place are not only the pre-requisite to
the construction and maintenance of the world of computers and other
toys and tools of the digital age, but are indispensable for the realization
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of  their  power  and  potential.  As  Umberto  Eco  has  noted,  digital
technologies  are  highly  textual  in  nature:  “the computer  returns  us  to
Gutenberg’s galaxy; from now on, everyone has to read” (2011, 4)
Prensky’s compelling metaphors of digital natives and immigrants appear
much  more  problematic  when  the  repressed  supplement  or  factor  of
writing  is  brought  into  the picture.  Reading,  writing,  programming  or
mathematics, for starters, are communicative activities that are not done
with  an  accent.  For  many  people  (particularly  outside  of  the  English
speaking world),  being able to engage in complex textual  activities like
reading or writing in a foreign language does not depend on the linguistic
or technical milieu into which one was born. Instead, what matters are
the  skills  and  abilities  one  acquires  through  emphatically  “unnatural,”
artiﬁcial effort and diﬃculty, often long after one has mastered one or
more spoken languages with the ease and eﬃciency of Piagetian learning
or learning-by-doing.
Conclusion: Dispelling Media Myths
In both the rationalist and the romantic pedagogical traditions, orality and
textuality  are reduced one to  the other.  In  the rationalist  tradition,  all
language is considered ultimately to be a code: a ﬁnite set of elements…
or symbols  governed by rational  structures and rules;  in  the romantic
tradition, all communication ultimately reduces to oral expression, and its
fundamental  “accents,  cries,  complaints.”  With  Derrida’s  notion  of  the
“supplement” and Kittler’s observation of the “shortcircuit in pedagogical
discourse,”  both identify  a  signiﬁcant  issue that  arises in  the way that
textuality and orality are conﬁgured in what I have called the “romantic”
tradition. However, there is much evidence to suggest that both Derrida
and  Kittler  display  an  aﬃnity  with  what  I  have  called  the  rationalist
position, particularly insofar as they aﬃrm that “it is the primal nature of
language to be written” (Foucault 1974, 37). For Derrida, this aﬃrmation
occurs  via  the  notion  of  arche-writing  and  its  self-deconstructing
différance that  governs not  only  speech but  also any other  imaginable
expressive  forms,  for  example,  cinema  or  choreography  (e.g.,  Derrida
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1976,  9).  For  Kittler,  this  aﬃrmation  is  particularly  clear  in  his  late
celebration of the expressive and recursive power of the written phonetic
alphabet  (particularly  as  it  is  instantiated  in  computing  machines).  As
Kittler  himself  has  proclaimed,  “[w]hat  is,  is  alphabetic.  This,  only  this,
metaphysics forgets” (Kittler, as cited in Heilmann, in press).
The analyses presented in this paper can be seen as illustrations of the
problems  presented  by  such  reductions,  speciﬁcally  as  they  apply  to
educational theory and practice. Writing and speech, at least insofar as
educational  theorizing is  concerned,  should be seen as heterogeneous
and mutually  irreducible.  Writing is  not  artiﬁcial  speech,  nor is  speech
simply or ultimately reducible to symbols and encodings. In focusing on
the  one  and  suppressing  the  other,  each  tradition  creates  signiﬁcant
distortions – ones that perhaps become clearer by recalling some of the
valorizations and signiﬁcances in the mythical accounts with which this
paper began. In these, writing is explicitly acquired and taught; it  is an
artiﬁce that is learned with diﬃculty, as if in a response to a command or
obligation. Speech, on the other hand, is something that is “naturally” or
always-already a part of the human condition.
This heterogeneity and mutual irreducibility is central to pedagogical or
didactic method, which frequently involves the invocation or simulation of
one medium through the other. Comenius wanted to bring people to a
natural Adamic conversation with God through the artiﬁciality of books
and  writing;  Cartesian  and  other  forms  of  cognitivism  begin  with
codiﬁcations and associated computational “machinery” to then imagine
how  speech  –  and  from  there,  other  media  –  might  interface  with  it.
Rousseau,  Pestalozzi  and  Dewey  –  and  after  them,  Papert  and  other
theorists  and  advocates  –  go  in  the  other  direction:  starting  with
expressive orality, they see a kind of natural “learning by doing” as paving
the path all the way from spontaneously learning to speak through to an
equally spontaneous mastery of text. These biases and valuations can be
said to represent a kind of “new mythology” of media education, a set of
narratives  and  conﬁgurations  that  might  beneﬁt  from  being  brought
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further  into  careful  and  conscious  alignment  with  older  myths  and
understandings.
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[1] “Cangjie”  is  now  used  to  designate  a  computer  input  method  for
entering Chinese characters (i.e. those allegedly invited by Cangjie) using
a standard keyboard.
[2] As Totah (1926) states: “When Charlemagne was learning to read his
letters with the sons of his nobles in the palace school, al-Ma’mūn was
studying and discussing philosophy in Baghdad and at a time when most
European children had no schools to attend, their Arab contemporaries
were enjoying the full beneﬁts of education” (15).
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